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UNDERSTANDING PLEADING DOCTRINEt 
A. Benjamin Spencer* 
Where does pleading doctrine, at the federal level, stand today? 
The Supreme Court's revision of general pleading standards in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly has not left courts and litigants with a 
clear or precise understanding of what it takes to state a claim that 
can survive a motion to dismiss. Claimants are required to show 
"plausible entitlement to relief" by offering enough facts "to raise 
a right to relief above the speculative level." Translating those ad­
monitions into predictable and consistent guidelines has proven 
illusory. This Article proposes a descriptive theory that explains the 
fundaments of contemporary pleading doctrine in a way that gives 
it some of the clarity and precision it otherwise lacks. The major 
descriptive thesis posited here is that the central animating princi­
ple of contemporary pleading doctrine is the requirement that a 
complaint-through the use of objective facts and supported impli­
cations-describe events about which there is a presumption of 
impropriety. Getting to that presumption requires different degrees 
of factual specificity depending on the factual and legal context of 
the claim. A secondary descriptive claim is that the doctrine in its 
current iteration privileges efficiency interests over the justice-related 
concerns of accuracy and procedural fairness. Unfortunately, this 
preference unduly harms the right of access to courts for those plain­
tiffs having claims that require the pleading of information they do 
not or cannot know. Further, it may be that certain types of claims, 
such as civil rights and antitrust claims, are more disadvantaged by 
this preference than others, suggesting that the doctrine needs to be 
recalibrated to better serve the interests of justice more evenly 
across different types of cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Access to justice is a cornerstone principle of our democracy. Vital to 
that principle is our civil justice system and the ease with which those who 
have been aggrieved are able to seek relief from the federal courts. Prior to 
the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, history had not 
been kind to those pressing their claims, with difficult and often insur­
mountable pleading standards characterizing the gate through which 
claimants had to pass to gain entry into the judicial system. 1 The Federal 
Rules ushered in a new era of open access for plaintiffs by casting aside 
complicated fact-pleading regimes in favor of simplified pleading2 and 
broad discovery.3 The idea was that decisions should be rooted in the merits, 
something not promoted, it was thought, through pleadings-based disposi­
tions of matters before discovery could ensue. 
As the liberality of the Federal Rules combined with the proliferation of 
public-rights legislation beginning in the 1960s4 and with reforms that made 
I. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) (discussing the 
history of common law and code pleading). 
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring the pleading of "a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'). 
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I) (entitling litigants to discovery of "any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party 's claim or defense "). 
4. Abram Chayes long ago discussed the advent of litigation involving the rights developed 
in public-rights legislation: 
Perhaps the dominating characteristic of modem federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise 
out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the object of litigation is 
the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies . 
. . . . School desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners ' or inmates' rights cases 
come readily to mind as avatars of this new form of litigation. But it would be mistaken to 
suppose that it is confined to these areas. Antitrust, securities fraud and other aspects of the 
conduct of corporate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, union governance, consumer 
fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reapportionment, environmental management--cases 
in all these fields display in varying degrees the features of public law litigation. 
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class actions a tool that more litigants could use,5 there was a perception that 
the federal courts were being flooded with a level of claims-some with 
merit but many without-that it increasingly could not efficiently handle.6 
Over time, courts began turning to pleading standards as a means of stem­
ming the tide of claims and separating the wheat from the chaff.7 Though the 
Supreme Court had indicated that Rule 8 required only simple notice plead­
ing with no need for factual detail, 8 lower federal courts developed and 
imposed their own more stringent pleading standards for certain claims that 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 
(1976). 
5. Rule 23, which governs class actions in the federal system, was amended in 1966. One of 
the most significant changes was the creation of Rule 23(b )(3), which liberalized class actions by 
authorizing them when the court finds that "the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is supe­
rior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. " FED. R. Ov. 
P. 23(b)(3). The Advisory Committee acknowledged that the justification for permitting class ac­
tions under such circumstances was questionable when it wrote, "In the situations to which this 
subdivision relates, class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as in those described above 
. . . .  " FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note {1966). Nevertheless, these so-called "opt­
out " class actions have come to dominate class-action practice at the federal level. See Thomas E. 
Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N. Y.U. 
L. REV. 74, 94 (1996) ("Of the 138 certified classes for which information was available, eighty­
four (61 percent) were (b)(3) classes, forty (29 percent) were (b)(2) classes, and the �emaining four­
teen (10 percent) reflected an equal number of (b){l )(A) and (b)( l )(B) classes. "). 
6. The debate over whether this perception matched reality has been ongoing for decades. 
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Mo. L. REV. 3, 7 (1986) 
("[The] evidence of current American litigation rates does not suggest that rates of civil court filings 
are dramatically higher than in the recent past. Nor is it the case that American rates are unmatched 
in other industrial countries. "); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation 
Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N. Y. U. L. REV. 982, 996 (2003) ("The foregoing shows that the supposed litiga­
tion crisis is the product of assumption; that reliable empirical data is in short supply; and that data 
exist that support any proposition. Thus, ow· should be cautious and refrain from trumpeting conclu­
sions on the subject lest it distract us from serious inquiry. "); Jack 8. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
190 I, 1907---09 ( 1989) ("Modern critics like Judges Bork and Posner and Justice Scalia say a 'litiga­
tion explosion ' has taken place since I 960 . . . .  The truth about the 'litigation explosion' is that it is 
a weapon of perception, not substance. If the public can be persuaded that there is a litigation crisis, 
it may support efforts to cut back on litigation access. "). 
7. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tux. L. REV. 551, 577-82 (2002) 
(chronicling the rise of heightened pleading). There were also changes to the Federal Rules designed 
to give courts more authority to forestall seemingly frivolous litigation. See FED. R. Ov. P. 16 advi­
sory committee's note (1983). The advisory note explained: 
Given the significant changes in federal civil litigation since 1938 that are not reflected in 
Rule 16, it has been extensively rewritten and expanded to meet the challenges of modern liti­
gation. Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at an early stage 
to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for completion by the parties of the 
principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with 
less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their own devices. 
Id.; see also FED. R. Ov. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) ("Experience shows that in prac­
tice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses . . .. The amended rule attempts to deal with 
the problem by building upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court to award 
expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or 
conducting litigation. "). 
8. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
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required increased levels of factual detail before such claims would be per­
mitted to proceed to discovery.9 On occasion, the Supreme Court chided the 
lower courts for this activity, 10 but never to an extent sufficient to quell selec­
tive imposition of these heightened pleading standards completely. 11 
Judicial inclination toward stricter pleading standards ultimately took 
hold among a majority of the Supreme Court itself when, in 2007, the Su­
preme Court decidedly revised its previous understanding of the nature of 
one's pleading obligation under the Federal Rules in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 12 a revision that has been affirmed and solidified by the Court's 
more recent decision in Ashcroft v. lqbal. 13 In Twombly, the Court reinter­
preted Rule 8 as requiring allegations that show a plausible entitlement to 
relief, a feat accomplished by offering substantiating facts that move liabil­
ity from a speculative possibility to something that discovery is reasonably 
likely to confirm. 14 Although some commentators 15 and the Court itself 16 
would perhaps deny it, Twombly appeared to be a departure from the simple 
"notice" pleading standard announced in Conley v. Gibson 11 and reaffirmed 
most notably in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit 18 and Swier­
kiewicz v. Sorema. 19 Under notice pleading, courts were prohibited-at least 
so far as the Supreme Court had been concerned-from dismissing a claim 
9. For a compilation of examples of this practice, see Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of 
Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, IOI 1-59 (2003) (discussing the heightened pleading stan­
dards imposed among the circuits for various types of claims, including antitrust, civil rights, RICO, 
conspiracy, and defamation claims). 
10. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 507 (2002) ("Imposing the Sec­
ond Circuit's heightened standard conflicts with Rule 8(a)'s express language, which requires 
simply that the complaint 'give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests. "' (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)); Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ("We think that it is impossi­
ble to square the 'heightened pleading standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the 
liberal system of 'notice pleading ' set up by the Federal Rules. "). 
11. The Court's statements regarding the requisites of simple "notice " pleading have not 
always been consistently or clearly supportive of a wide-open, liberal approach. In Dura Pharma­
ceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), the Court repeated its loyalty to the notice-pleading 
concept but went on to hold that notice required the plaintiff in a securities fraud case to plead more 
specific information regarding "the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind. " Id. 
at 347. 
12. 550 U.S. 544, 554-55, 560-61 (2007). 
13. 129 s. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
14. 550 U.S. at 555-56. 
15. See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) ("Twombly changed antitrust law by 
modifying the elements of an antitrust conspiracy claim, but did not rework pleading rules across the 
board. "). 
16. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) ("Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.' Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair 
notice of what the . . .  claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' "). 
17. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
18. 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993). 
19. 534 U.S. 506, 507 (2002). 
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unless it was clear that there was "no set of facts" that the plaintiff could 
prove to establish the claim.20 It was this "no set of facts" language from 
Conley that the Twombly Court abrogated as it articulated its new vision of 
what pleading under Rule 8(a) requires.21 
In previous writings I have set forth my understanding of the meaning of 
Twombly,22 explained why I feel that the Court's pronouncements in the case 
were misguided,23 and chronicled lower-court reaction to and application of 
Twombly's standards to civil rights claims.24 In this latest installment of my 
ongoing project to understand federal civil pleading standards, I turn to an 
effort to engage in a systematic analysis of contemporary pleading doctrine 
that will hopefully yield a comprehensive theoretical description of its fun­
damental components and underlying rationale. 
Although Twombly and Iqbal do not by themselves supply all one needs 
to know about pleading doctrine today, the decisions-by largely ratifying 
the heretofore renegade practice of imposing fact-pleading requirements­
have brought together theory and practice in a way that enables a unified 
analysis of pleading doctrine as stated and the doctrine as applied that will 
be free of the internal inconsistencies that characterized the pre-Twombly 
pleading world. In other words, by bringing fact pleading out of the shadows 
and giving it its imprimatur, the Supreme Court has made it possible now to 
discuss pleading doctrine without having to contend with the pesky contra­
dictions between the Court's previously high-minded rhetoric about notice 
pleading and the reality on the ground of particularized pleading. Thus, the 
merger of rhetoric with reality that Twombly (and Iqbal) accomplished gives 
us an occasion to assess the precise character, structure, and purpose of 
pleading doctrine within the federal system as a whole. 
The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the need for a 
descriptive theory of pleading, which, in brief, is rooted in the need to give 
some practical meaning to the broad and confusing pronouncements of 
Twombly and to develop an explanation for the level of factual detail a com­
plaint will require in any given substantive legal context. Part II presents the 
descriptive theory, which holds that the central defining principle of con­
temporary pleading doctrine is the requirement that a complaint-through 
the use of objective facts and supported implications25 -describe events 
about which there is a presumption of impropriety. Getting to that presump­
tion requires different degrees of factual specificity depending on the factual 
and legal context of the claim. Part III seeks to uncover the core value or 
values that animate pleading doctrine, focusing on the values of notice, 
20. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. 
2 1 .  Bell Atl. Corp. v .  Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007). 
22. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 43 1 (2008). 
23. Id. 
24. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 How. 
L.J .  99 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims]. 
25. I define these terms in Part III below. 
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efficiency, and justice. Part IV evaluates the doctrine as clarified by the de­
scriptive theory, focusing on its imbalance with respect to vindicating the 
concerns of efficiency over justice and the consequent disadvantaging of 
certain types of claims. 
I. THE NEED FOR A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF PLEADING 
The pleading doctrine that emanates from Twombly suffers from two de­
fects that hamper courts and litigants in their efforts to understand and apply 
it. First, the Twombly opinion was insufficiently clear regarding whether 
notice pleading survives the decision, the extent to which facts are now re­
quired in pleadings, and the nature and vitality of the requirement to accept 
nonmovants' factual allegations as true in the face of a motion to dismiss. 
Second, the doctrinal signals flowing from Twombly are too imprecise and 
subjective to facilitate the proper and consistent application of pleading re­
quirements across jurisdictions. After reviewing these clarity and precision 
problems, this Part will lay the groundwork for approaching a theory of 
pleading that can give greater definition to what Twombly �nd the relevant 
provisions within the Federal Rules require of litigants asserting claims. 
A. A Lack of Clarity 
A central question in the wake of Twombly is whether so-called notice 
pleading survived the decision. Unfortunately, the Court's own inconsistent 
rhetoric has been responsible in large part for a lack of clarity on this issue.26 
For instance, the Twombly Court affirmed that "a complaint attacked by a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,"27 
but then wrote that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level"28 and "a complaint must allege facts sug­
gestive of illegal conduct."29 Although requiring the pleading of suggestive 
facts seems akin to particularized fact pleading of the kind previously 
thought not compelled by Rule 8, the Court sought to assure readers that 
"we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics."30 Subsequently 
(merely a couple of weeks later), in Erickson v. Pardui1 the Court wrote that 
under Rule 8 "[s]pecific facts are not necessary ; the statement need only 
'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .  claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.' "32 That is easy to say, but the notion that all a complaint 
needs to do is provide fair notice hardly rests comfortably with the Court's 
26. It might be said that Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), provides a bit more clarity 
on the matter, since the majority there makes no mention of the notice-pleading concept at all. 
27. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 564 n.8. 
30. Id. at 570. 
31. 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). 
32. Id. at 93 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
October 2009] Understanding Pleading Doctrine 7 
clear command that the complaint must also demonstrate plausible entitle­
ment to relief, a task that will be difficult to accomplish in many cases 
without the type of factual detail the Court claims to be unnecessary. 
Lower courts have been confused by these mixed signals,33 causing them 
to reach varying conclusions about whether notice pleading remains or has 
been supplanted by something new. The Third Circuit gave voice to this 
confusion: 
What makes Twombly's impact on the Rule I 2(b )(6) standard initially 
so confusing is that it introduces a new "plausibility" paradigm for evaluat­
ing the sufficiency of complaints. At the same time, however, the Supreme 
Court never said that it intended a drastic change in the law, and indeed 
strove to convey the opposite impression; even in rejecting Conley's "no 
set of facts" language, the Court does not appear to have believed that it 
was really changing the Rule 8 or Rule 1 2(b)(6) framework.
34 
As further testament to this confusion, there are also courts that flatly 
indicate that heightened pleading is now required, looking past the Supreme 
Court's statements disavowing such pleading to the reality of what the plau­
sibility standard actually requires.35 At the other end of the spectrum are 
courts that insist that the ordinary pleading standard continues to be a liberal 
one focused on notice,36 with some courts even going so far as to apply the 
repudiated "no set of facts" test to scrutinize the sufficiency of claims.37 On 
the issue of whether specific facts are needed in the pleadings after Twom­
bly, the lower federal courts have also expressed divergent views.38 
33. See, e.g., Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 337 n.4 (6th 
Cir. 2007) ("We have noted some uncertainty concerning the scope of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 1\vom­
bly . . . . "). 
34. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). 
35. See, e.g., Mountain Area Realty, Inc. v. Wintergreen Partners, Inc., No. 3:07cv00016, 
2007 WL 4561293, at *2 (W.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2007) ("[I]n the antitrust context there is a heightened 
standard of pleading as elucidated by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly 
. . . .  "). 
36. See, e.g., Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
Twombly "did not . . .  supplant the basic notice-pleading standard "); Filipek v. Krass, 576 F. Supp. 
2d 918, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (referring to the Twombly plausibility approach as a "liberal notice­
pleading standard "); Mull v. Abbott Labs., 563 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930 (N.D. 111. 2008) ("[T]he Court 
did not adopt a fact-pleading standard to supplant the notice-pleading standard that has long applied 
in federal court. "). 
37. See, e.g., Goltens N.Y. Corp. v. Golten, No. 07 CV 9711 (GBD), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
56280, at *6-7 (S.D.N. Y. July 23, 2008) ("Dismissal is improper unless it appears beyond doubt, 
even when the complaint is liberally construed, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which 
would entitle him to relief. ") (internal quotation marks omitted); De Ville v. Reg '! Transit Auth., No. 
07-1345, 2008 WL 200020, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 2008) ("Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. l 2(b)(6) is proper only if the pleadings on their face reveal beyond a doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief . . . .  "). 
38. Compare Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., No. H-08-0451, 2008 WL 21 18170, at *2 
(S.D. Tex. May 16, 2008) ("To avoid dismissal pleadings must contain specific, well-pleaded facts, 
not mere conclusory allegations. " (citing Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 
1992))), with id. at *6 ("Rule 8(a) does not require pleading specific facts in support of each element 
of a plaintiff's prima facie case . . . .  " (quoting Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 438 (5th 
Cir. 2004))). One cou:1 tried to reconcile the simultaneous need for sufficient facts with the notion 
8 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108: 1 
There are also courts in the middle, whose opinions reveal a tension be­
tween the tendency to affirm the continuation of notice pleading and the 
sense that the Supreme Court has revised that standard or even supplanted it 
with a new, more stringent one. For example, in Challenger Powerboats, 
Inc. v. Evans39 the court referred to "the new standard of review delineated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,"40 but 
in the next breath wrote that "[t]he simplified notice pleading standard under 
[Rule] 8(a) requires only a statement that gives the defendant fair notice of 
what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."4 1 This ten­
sion also plays itself out in the effort of courts to require factual specifics 
while simultaneously reciting the official line that specifics are not required; 
thus, as one court remarked, "Missing, however, is any specific allegation 
that defendants' representatives actually met to fix prices . . . .  This is not to 
say that to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead specific back­
room meetings between specific actors at which specific decisions were 
made."42 
In addition to confusion over whether fact pleading has replaced a true 
notice-pleading regime, there is some evidence that Twombly has weakened 
the requirement that courts assume the truth of a claimant's factual asser­
tions.43 A long-standing component of pleading jurisprudence under the 
Federal Rules has been that a court is obligated to assume the truth of all of 
the factual allegations in the complaint and to construe such allegations in a 
that detailed facts are not required thusly: "While the factual allegations need not be pleaded in great 
detail, they must be sufficiently precise to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. " Effkay 
Enters. v. J.H. Cleaners, Inc., No. 07-cv-02521 -LTB, 2008 WL 2357698, at *2 (D. Colo. June 5, 
2008). 
39. No. 4:07CV85 TIA, 2007 WL 2885346 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2007). 
40. Id. at *2 (emphasis added); see also Bonanno v. Quizno's Franchise Co., No. 06-cv-
02358-WYD-KLM, 2008 WL 638367, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court . . .  has 
prescribed a new inquiry for us to use in reviewing a dismissal: whether the complaint contains 
'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). 
4 1 .  Challenger Powerboats, 2007 WL 2885346, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Gregory v. Dillard's, Inc., 494 F.3d 694, 7 1 0  (8th Cir. 2007) (referring post-Twombly to "the 
simplified notice pleading standard "), vacated and reh 'g en bane granted, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
30549 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 2007). 
42. In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1 0 1 1, 1 023-24 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007); see also Gregory, 494 F.3d at 7 10  (stating that "[g]reat precision is not required of the 
pleadings " but upholding a complaint as sufficient because "[t]he complaint states how, when, and 
where [the plaintiffs] were discriminated against "); Lady Deborah's, Inc. v. VT Griffin Servs., Inc., 
No. CV207-079, 2007 WL 4468672, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2007) ("Conclusory allegations that 
defendant violated the antitrust laws and plaintiff was injured thereby will not survive a motion to 
dismiss if not supported by facts constituting a legitimate claim for relief . . . .  However, the alleged 
facts need not be spelled out with exactitude, nor must recovery appear imminent. " (quoting Quality 
Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev. Corp., 7 11  F.2d 989, 995 (I I th Cir. 
1 983))). 
43. At least one court has suggested that Twombly did away with the assumption-of-truth 
rule altogether. See United States ex rel. Phillips v. Front Range Home Improvements, Ltd., No. 06-
cv-00927-WYD-MJW, 2008 WL 18 18003, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 2 1 ,  2008) ("In ruling on a Motion to 
Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), the standard used to be that the court 'must accept all the well-pleaded 
allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.' " 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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light favorable to the plaintiff.44 The Twombly Court itself repeated this rule, 
writing that courts must assume that "all the allegations in the complaint are 
true (even if doubtful in fact)."45 And, to be sure, most courts have continued 
to state the assumption-of-truth rule.46 However, the Twombly Court's state­
ments regarding plausibility have given some courts a basis for applying 
more skepticism to factual allegations than the assumption-of-truth principle 
would seem to allow. For example, in DavCo Acquisition Holding, Inc. v. 
Wendy 's lnternationat1 the plaintiff made clear factual assertions, namely, 
that: ( 1 )  Coca-Cola paid Wendy's $42 million plus a portion of the proceeds 
of syrup sales to Wendy's; (2) Coca-Cola inflated the price of its syrup sold 
to Wendy's franchisees to cover the cost of these contributions; and (3) the 
price inflation was done pursuant to an agreement between Coca-Cola and 
Wendy's with the idea that Coca-Cola would kick back to Wendy's excess 
profits on the sale of its syrup to franchisees.48 The judge rejected the plain­
tiff's allegation of a price-fixing conspiracy and kickback scheme as too 
speculative, concluding that there were no facts offered to back up that 
assertion.49 The assumption-of-truth rule would seem to require that the 
above-mentioned allegations be accepted as true, in which case an unlaw­
ful conspiracy would be properly described. That this and other courts50 
have understood Twombly as permitting healthier doses of fact skepticism 
notwithstanding the assumption-of-truth principle is only confirmation 
that Twombly's ultimate message regarding pleading standards is unclear.5 1  
B. A Lack of Precision 
Pleading doctrine after Twombly also suffers from a lack of precision. To 
be fair, the core standard articulated in Rule 8 is itself imprecise to a certain 
44. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]his Court must, on 
this Rule 1 2(b)(6) motion to dismiss, assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [the plaintiff] . . . .  "). 
45. Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
46. See, e.g., Am. Int'! Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 05-1020 C, 2008 WL 
1990859, at  *12 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 31, 2008) ("In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court assumes that 
the allegations in the complaint are true and construes those allegations in plaintiff's favor. "). 
47. No. 2:07-cv-1064, 2008 WL 755283, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2008). 
48. Id. at *8-9. 
49. /d. at *l 0. 
50. For example, in Snead v. Unknown Number of U.S. Bureau of Prisons Officers, No. 2:08-
cv-123 (S.D. Ind. June 20, 2008), the court, on a motion to dismiss, recharacterized the inmate­
plaintiff's allegation that he "tossed bread back on the counter " and was then beaten by the inmate 
food service worker as "Snead proceeded to throw the wet bread at Boyd [the inmate food service 
worker], " thus provoking the beating that Snead subsequently received. This is a clear violation of 
the assumption-of-truth principle that likely fed into the court's ultimate conclusion that there was 
an "absence of a plausible basis for recovery under the Eighth Amendment. " Id. at *2. 
51. The message from the Court in its follow up to Twombly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009), may suggest fact skepticism even more strongly given the Iqbal majority's determina­
tion that the plaintiff's allegations of top-level involvement in shaping the discriminatory policy of 
which he was complaining was "not entitled to the assumption of truth. " Id. at 1940. 
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extent; there is no objective understanding of what makes a statement 
"short" or "plain" and what one must do to show entitlement to relief is 
hardly self-evident. Even Conley's explanation that the complaint must only 
"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .  claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests"52 leaves us wondering when "fair notice" is achieved. 
However, what gave pleading doctrine some precision before Twombly was 
the other famous remark from Conley: "[A] complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief."53 Broad and permissive as that now-repudiated standard may 
have been, whether a complaint satisfied that test-at least as a theoretical 
matter-was less subject to debate.54 
The doctrine as modified by Twombly is much less precise. This defect 
arises from the Twombly Court's repeated use of subjective concepts as the 
building blocks of its iteration of the doctrine. Specifically, the Court vari­
ously articulates the appropriate standard by offering the following 
guidance: 
[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to 
relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recita­
tion of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
55 
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the spe­
culative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are 
true (even if doubtful in fact).
56 
[W]e hold that stating [a Sherman Act Section l ]  claim requires a com­
plaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an 
agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement 
does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply 
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.
57 
The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not 
merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of 
Rule 8(a)(2) that the "plain statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that 
the pleader is entitled to relief."58 
52. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
53. Id. at 45-46. 
54. That said, it is certainly true that this standard in its pure form was departed from prior to 
Twombly with great frequency, either through the imposition of heightened pleading, or through 
application of the court-created rule that the pleading of legal conclusions was insufficient. Height­
ened pleading standards and the rule against pleading legal conclusions both lack the precision of 
the "no set of facts" standard. 
55. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
56. Id. (citation omitted). 
57. Id. at 556. 
58. Id. at 557. 
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Concepts such as "more than labels and conclusions," "above the specu­
lative level," "plausible grounds to infer," "enough factual matter to 
suggest," "reasonable expectation," and "enough heft" are instructive in that 
they tell litigants that more than a possibility but less than a probability must 
be shown. Beyond that, however, there is uncertainty regarding precisely 
what level of factual detail will make a statement of a claim plausible and 
nonspeculative. Indeed, courts may disagree regarding the plausibility of a 
claim unless that term is given more objective definition. Absent further 
specification, then, the Twombly pleading standard requiring plausibility 
might be too subjective to yield predictable and consistent results across 
cases. Developing a theory that describes the essence of what the Twombly 
Court was getting at would thus lend much-needed precision to the doctrine. 
C. Approaching the Theory 
The lack of clarity and precision described above is problematic because 
claimants will be uncertain about what they must plead, defendants will be 
emboldened to challenge the sufficiency of claims, and courts may apply 
inconsistent standards that lead to divergent results in similar cases. What is 
needed, then, is a deconstruction of pleading doctrine post-Twombly, one 
that goes beyond court rhetoric and seeks to get at the heart of what the doc­
trine truly requires in the ordinary case.59 
Our journey to deconstruct pleading doctrine must begin with a brief re­
view of what the two most important sources of pleading law-Federal Rule 
8(a) and the Twombly decision-say about the requisites of properly stating 
a claim. Rule 8(a) offers us this familiar admonition: "A pleading that states 
a claim for relief must contain . . .  a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."60 Although our attention previ­
ously might have been on the need for the statement to be "short and plain" 
and the Court's earlier indication that notice of the grounds for relief-not 
factual detail-were the heart of this standard,61 Twombly has turned our 
gaze toward the obligation under the rule to make a "showing" that the 
pleader is (if the allegations are true) entitled to relief. Several statements 
from Twombly indicate this shift. First, the Court emphasized that "Rule 
8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitle­
ment to relief."62 Mere legal "labels and conclusions" that simply recite the 
elements of a cause of action cannot make such a showing.63 Rather, it takes 
59. We are concerned here only with doctrine covering pleading under Rule 8(a)(2), which 
covers ordinary claims, rather than the doctrine governing claims for which heightened pleading is 
prescribed, such as claims of fraud. 
60. Fm R. Cl v. P. 8(a)(2). 
61. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 4 1 ,  45-46 (1957). 
62. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3. 
63. Id. at 555 ("[A] plaintiff 's obligation to provide the 'grounds ' of his 'entitle[ment] to 
relief ' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do. "). 
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factual allegations to do the job.64 Second, the Court indicated that the Rule 
8(a) "showing" is one that must plausibly demonstrate entitlement to relief, 
not simply render entitlement a possibility.65 Such a demonstration is made 
only if the facts presented move from being speculative,66 toward-aided by 
the assumption of truth67-being suggestive of liability.68 
Although we know, then, that Rule 8 under Twombly requires the allega­
tion of facts that plausibly suggest entitlement to relief, we still lack a 
concrete understanding of what that means in practical terms. That is, if it is 
simultaneously true that "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations"69 but that "[f]actual alle­
gations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level,"70 how are courts and litigants to figure out when sufficient facts have 
been alleged? The Federal Rules do give some additional guidance by refer­
ring us to the Appendix of Forms.7 1 For example, Form 1 1  reads, "On date, 
at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plain­
tiff."72 Form 12 reads, "On date, at place, defendant name or defendant 
name or both of them willfully or recklessly or negligently drove, or caused 
to be driven, a motor vehicle against the plaintiff."73 
Do these forms really comply with the Twombly standard? They do in­
clude factual allegations regarding the time and location of the accident and 
the fact that the defendant drove a motor vehicle into the plaintiff. But what 
of the conclusory terms "negligently," "willfully," and "recklessly"? 
Twombly suggested that conclusory terms could not be made to do the work 
of actual fact allegations.74 Use of "negligently" in Form 1 1  is shorthand for 
alleging that the defendant breached some applicable duty of care in causing 
this accident. However, the facts supporting the plaintiff's notion that there 
64. Id. at 555 n.3 ("Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a 
claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, 
but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests. "). 
65. Id. at 557 (speaking of the need to traverse "the line between possibility and plausibility 
of 'entitle[ment] to relief ' "). 
66. Id. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the specu­
lative level . . . .  "). 
67. Id. (restating "the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact) "). 
68. Id. at 557 ("The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not 
merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 'plain 
statement' possess enough heft to 'sho[ w] that the pleader is entitled to relief. "'); id. at 557 n.5 
("The border . . . .  between the factually neutral and the factually suggestive . . . .  must be crossed to 
enter the realm of plausible liability. "). 
69. Id. at 555. 
70. Id. 
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 84 ("The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate 
the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate. "). 
72. FED. R. Civ. P. form 1 1. 
73. FED. R. Civ. P. form 12. 
74. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("[A] plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 
'entitle[ment] to relief ' requires more than labels and conclusions . . . .  "). 
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was such a breach are not offered; the same can be said of Form 1 2's use of 
"willfully" and "recklessly."75 How then are these model statements sugges­
tive of an entitlement to relief if liability is premised on undisclosed facts 
about the defendant's conduct? A better question still: how can the deemed 
sufficiency of these and other official forms be reconciled with Twombly's 
admonition that suggestive facts rather than legal conclusions be pleaded? 
Finally, if it is acceptable to use "recklessly" to tum a description of facts 
into a sufficient statement of a legal claim, why can the terms "discriminato­
rily" or "conspired" not be used to the same effect, as in "On date, at place, 
the defendant discriminatorily fired me from my job based on gender"?76 
Professor Ides defends the sufficiency of Form 1 1  by arguing that "from 
the facts alleged, including the 'conclusory' allegation of negligence, one 
can infer the types of facts the plaintiff will rely on to establish the asserted 
claim, albeit not the precise facts . . . .  "77 This argument is ultimately incom­
plete, however, because it does not reveal what about the form's statement is 
suggestive of a breach of duty nor does it give us a principle that will tell us 
why the same approach will not work for a discrimination claim. If a com­
plaint used the term "discriminatorily" as in the example at the end of the 
previous paragraph, one could still "infer the types of facts the plaintiff will 
rely on to establish the asserted claim" as Professor Ides said was the case 
for the negligence claim.78 This characteristic thus fails to get at the heart of 
what distinguishes a sufficient claim from an insufficient one under current 
pleading doctrine. A theory, then, is needed both to concretize Twombly's 
expectations for pleadings and also to explain how the use of conclusory 
legal terms in connection with other facts works in some contexts (such as 
the negligence and recklessness claims of Forms 1 1  and 1 2) but not in others 
such as discrimination or antitrust conspiracy claims. It is to the develop­
ment of such a theory that we will now tum. 
II. A PRESUMPTION-BASED THEORY OF PLEADING 
Twombly and Iqbal leave no doubt that to state a claim sufficiently, a 
plaintiff must allege at least some facts. But what level of factual specificity 
is required under Rule 8? Twombly's answer is that enough facts must be 
75. See Spencer, supra note 22, at 472 ("[W]hat makes the defendant's driving reckless in 
Form 12? Excessive speed? Driving on the wrong side of the road? Driving at night without head­
lights illuminated? "). 
76. There is extensive case law revealing the insufficiency of such a statement of an unlaw­
ful-discrimination claim. For my review of this body of precedent, both pre- and post-Twombly, see 
Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 24. 
77. Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 
604, 612-13 (2007). 
78. For example, one might infer in such a case that the plaintiff will elicit documents, com­
munications, or statements from witnesses that indicate gender was the motivating factor behind the 
dismissal. 
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offered to render the claim plausible an'd not speculative.79 What does this 
mean in practice? As it turns out, the type of factual detail needed to achieve 
this goal varies depending on the legal and factual context in which a claim 
is situated. 80 More specifically, it appears that legal claims that apply liabil­
ity to factual scenarios that otherwise do not bespeak wrongdoing will be 
those that tend to require greater factual substantiation to traverse the plau­
sibility threshold. Let me explain. 
Any given factual scenario8 1  will either convey some sense of specific 
wrongdoing in the eyes of the law, will be neutral in that respect, or will 
affirmatively indicate the absence of wrongdoing.82 It is the line between the 
first two circumstances that is our concern.83 An example of a factual sce­
nario that conveys a sense of wrongdoing might be the following: "A and B 
entered into a contract that obligated B to do X; B failed to do X and thus 
failed to perform her duty under the contract; A was harmed by B's failure to 
perform in the amount of Y dollars." This statement suggests wrongdoing on 
the part of B because if it is true, B is liable for breach of contract. In other 
words, the hypothetical scenario presents circumstances that possess what I 
will refer to as a presumption of impropriety. Notice that this presumption 
arises solely as a result of the allegation of observed or experienced objec­
tive facts about what transpired-the existence of a contract84 specify ing the 
79. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. 
80. This is a notion picked up on by Chief Justice Roberts, as reflected in his comments 
during the oral argument for Ashcroft v. Iqbal: "l thought in Bell Atlantic what we said is that there's 
a standard but it's [] affected by the context in which the allegations are made. That was a context of 
a particular type of antitrust violation and that affected how we would look at the complaint. " Tran­
script of Oral Argument at *37, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015). 
8 I .  Here I am not speaking of factless scenarios such as "The defendant had a duty of care 
that it breached against the plaintiff'' or "The defendant's product was unreasonably dangerous and 
therefore defective. " Such allegations, which simply convert the elements of a legal claim into af­
firmative, factless assertions, are conclusory and completely fail to show entitlement to relief. See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds ' of his 'entitle[ment] 
to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do. "). 
82. An example of this latter circumstance is found in Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Ex­
change, 537 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2008), where the complaint alleged intentional discrimination but 
alleged facts indicating defendant's use of neutral criteria, something that would support a disparate­
impact case. Id. at 964 ("[P]laintiffs provide no factual basis for their conclusory allegations that the 
Insurers intentionally charged rates based on a homeowner's race. Their factually explicit allegations 
are that the Insurers used rating zones based on facially neutral risk factors that have a disparate 
racial impact. "). 
83. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (speaking of "the line between possibility and plausibility 
of entitlement to relief') (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84. Although the term "contract " is itself a legal term of art, its use here by the plaintiff 
makes a factual statement about the creation of a binding agreement between the plaintiff himself 
and the defendant. The obligation to accept the truth of plaintiff 's factual assertions obviates the 
need for treating the allegation of a "contract " as a legal rather than factual allegation because the 
plaintiff may simply append the contract to the complaint, if written, or simply attest to the terms of 
the agreement, if oral or written, to support the assertion. Any effort to challenge the veracity of the 
plaintiff's representations about the matter would be inappropriate at the pleading stage. Contrast 
this with the allegation of a "conspiracy " or an "agreement " in the antitrust context. Because the 
plaintiff is making a claim about what transpired between the defendants or between the defendants 
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duty of X, B's nonperformance, and harm to A-rather than a supposition 
about B's state of mind or subjective motivations. Form 1 1  suggests another 
example of a statement possessing a presumption of impropriety: "On [date] 
at [place] B struck A with his motor vehicle and A suffered personal injuries 
as a result."85 Because one does not ordinarily hit a person with a motor ve­
hicle, the facts described suggest wrongdoing and thus enjoy the 
presumption of impropriety.86 These observations lead to an initial proposi­
tion in the theory of pleading we are presently developing: 
Proposition I: If allegations of objective facts present a scenario that, if 
true, suggests wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, that scenario pos­
sesses a presumption of impropriety and thus sufficiently states a claim. 
Conversely, however, when a factual scenario is neutral respecting 
wrongdoing, the presumption of impropriety will not apply. An example of 
such a scenario would be a statement to the following effect: "B fired A 
from her job and A was damaged as a result." The objective facts offered do 
not suggest wrongdoing because B could have had legitimate reasons for 
firing A;  firings in our society are not ordinarily or presumptively for inap­
propriate reasons. Because, as the Supreme Court has now reminded us, 
Rule 8 requires that a statement of a claim must make a "showing" that the 
pleader is "entitled" to relief,87 if lawful reasons could explain factual occur­
rences reported in a complaint just as well as unlawful ones might, no such 
showing of entitlement has been made. Rather, there may simply be a possi­
bility of liability, but not one about which there can be any confidence 
absent additional information. Under such circumstances, then, we would be 
able to say that the scenario enjoys a presumption of propriety. Another ex­
ample would be "ABC, Inc. manufactured product X; product X failed to 
perform properly ; Plaintiff was injured and suffered damages as a result." 
Although something is amiss when a product fails to perform properly, the 
presumption is not that the failure is attributable to the manufacturer; the 
manufacturer's fault may be an explanation, but other explanations such as 
and third parties rather than between the attesting plaintiff and others, the assertion ceases to be an 
objective fact that the plaintiff can report simply by invocation of the previously quoted terms. 
85. See FED. R. C!v. P. form 1 1  (providing acceptable language for alleging negligence in the 
context of a motor-vehicle collision). 
86. In other words, hitting a person with a motor vehicle deviates sufficiently from ordinary 
behavior that we incline toward the conclusion that something is awry, namely, that the operator of 
the vehicle did something wrong. Several commentators have attempted to get at this concept of a 
set of facts that deviate from the ordinary in a way that suggests wrongdoing. Professor Robert G. 
Bone, building on the analysis offered in this Article, refers to "a baseline of normality" as the stan­
dard against which such deviations should be judged. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, 
and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 888-89 (2009) ("What Twombly requires 
are allegations describing a state of affairs that differs from a baseline of normality, and in a way 
that supports a stronger correlation to wrongdoing than for baseline conduct."). Professor Geoffrey 
Miller refers to the notion of our "ordinary assumptions about the world" and "background assump­
tion[s]" about individual or corporate behavior as the measuring rod for sensing wrongdoing when a 
reading of a set of facts. Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading after Tellabs 4, 9 (NYU Law & Econ. Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08- 16, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l l 2 1 396. 
87. FED. R. C!v. P. 8(a)(2); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 ("Rule 8(a)(2) still re­
quires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief."). 
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damage by the seller or misuse by the consumer are equally possible alter­
nate explanations. More factual information is needed to overcome the 
presumption of propriety to suggest liability on the part of the manufacturer. 
Thus we arrive at the second proposition of the theory : 
Proposition 2: If allegations of objective facts present a scenario that, if 
true, is neutral with respect to wrongdoing by the defendant, that scenario 
enjoys a presumption of propriety and thus fails to state a claim. 
These were the conditions that obtained in Twombly. As the Court wrote 
there, "The inadequacy of showing parallel conduct or interdependence, 
without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent with con­
spiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and 
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions 
of the market."88 The facts presented were equivocal and thus the presump­
tion of propriety was not overcome. 
What additional information would help either of the preceding hypo­
thetical examples overcome the presumption of propriety? In our first 
example, adding "because of my race" to the assertion that "B fired A from 
her job" would be a step in the right direction, for it would indicate that the 
reasons for the termination were indeed illegitimate. However, we now con­
front a new problem. The scenario as initially stated consisted exclusively of 
objective facts that failed to tilt either toward a legitimate or illegitimate 
explanation. The proffered amendment attributing the firing to the race of 
the employee does not offer an additional objective fact but rather a supposi­
tion. That is, without more information, the allegation that race was the 
motive in the dismissal is not a fact that any disinterested party could have 
observed, but is rather a belief that the claimant has about what the defen­
dant's motives were. Suppositions that are unsupported by additional 
objective facts are simply speculativ e suppositions. Here, then, we reach our 
third proposition of the theory : 
Proposition 3: If the objective facts alleged present a scenario that enjoys a 
presumption of propriety, the addition of speculative suppositions to sug­
gest wrongdoing will not overcome that presumption and the pleading will 
fail to state a claim. 
Thus, in our second example, adding "because of a manufacturing defect" to 
the allegation that "product X failed to perform properly" will not overcome 
the presumption of propriety because the plaintiff-in the absence of any 
additional information-is merely supposing or speculating that a manufac­
turing defect is to blame. 
We ask again, then, what further allegations would cause these two sce­
narios to escape the presumption of propriety. In short, the infusion of 
additional objective facts suggestive of impropriety on the part of the defen­
dant should do the trick. Thus, the wrongful-termination allegations become 
sufficient when modified as follows: "B fired A from her job because of sex 
88. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. 
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and race; B fired A by telling her, 'You are too black for this job, and i t  is 
not a job a woman should be doing any way ' ;  A was damaged as a result." 
Now the plaintiff has supplied an objective fact that suggests a wrongful 
rather than a permissible termination, thus overcoming the presumption of 
propriety. Other additional objective facts, such as the fact that the employer 
failed to terminate less qualified non-African American employees, would 
also be suggestive of wrongdoing.89 Although the ultimate allegation that the 
termination was based on sex and race itself is not an objective fact, the as­
sertion is no longer a speculative supposition because there is an objective 
fact that supports it. Thus, the allegation is now a supported implication.90 
Our fourth proposition, then, is as follows: 
Proposition 4: If the objective facts alleged present a scenario that enjoys a 
presumption of propriety, the addition of supported implications that sug­
gest wrongdoing will overcome that presumption and thus the pleading 
will properly state a claim. 
This proposition explains what the Twombly Court was looking for when 
it wrote, "[W]hen allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make 
a § I claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a 
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be 
independent action."9 1  
How would our second hypothetical claim of a manufacturing defect be­
come a supported implication rather than a speculative supposition? 
Consider a complaint that alleged the following: 
ABC, Inc. manufactured Brand X windshields; ABC made its windshields 
by gluing two pieces of glass together at the center of the windshield, a 
process that makes the windshield highly susceptible to shattering in high 
winds or when hit with water; the plaintiff's Brand X windshield failed to 
perform properly by shattering in the rain because of this manufacturing 
defect; Plaintiff was injured and suffered damages as a result. 
89. The pleadings in Mull v. Abbott Laboratories, 563 F. Supp. 2d 925, (N.D. Ill. 2008), 
provide an example: 
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is African-American; that she worked for Defendant for nearly 
six years and performed her job satisfactorily; and that Defendant took various adverse actions 
against her based on her race, including terminating her. She further alleges that less qualified 
non-African-American employees, including one whom Plaintiff trained, were not terminated. 
Plaintiff has pied enough to state a plausible claim for discriminatory discharge. 
Id. at 930-3 1 ;  see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
plaintiff adequately stated sex-discrimination claim where she alleged that she is female; she suf­
fered adverse employment action; defendant discriminated against her based on her sex; and 
similarly situated male employees were treated more favorably). 
90. The concept of a supported implication is the "reasonable inference" to which courts 
refer when they recite their obligation to "accept well-pied factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and make all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor." Miss. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. 
Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 85 ( I st Cir. 2008). 
9 1 .  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; see also id. ("A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct 
consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1 
claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a 
defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory."). 
1 8  Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108: 1 
The new information regarding the manufacturing process and the dan­
gerousness of using that process can be characterized as objective facts in 
that they are facts that disinterested third parties could either observe or ver­
ify through testing. In this context, the claim that the failure of the 
windshield is attributable to a manufacturing defect is a supported implica­
tion, because the objective facts alleged indicate the presence of a problem 
that would cause the incident that the plaintiff describes. 
To summarize, successfully stating a claim requires the presentation of a 
factual scenario that possesses a presumption of impropriety based on objec­
tive facts and supported implications. To use the Twombly Court's terms, a 
scenario possessing a presumption of impropriety based on objective facts 
and supported implications states a plausible claim, while neutral facts rely­
ing on speculative suppositions to show liability will merely state possible,92 
" bl
93 
1 • 94 1 • conce1va e, or specu attve c aims. 
III. THE VALUES OF PLEADING 
Thus far we have established that contemporary pleading doctrine re­
quires the allegation of objective facts coupled with supported implications 
before a claim may proceed and that those legal claims that tend to rely on 
suppositions about motivation or concealed activities will require more fac­
tual detail. Now we tum to a consideration of what values underlie the 
doctrine to arrive at some additional principles that might inform our under­
standing of how pleadings are to be scrutinized under Twombly. Historically, 
there have been three-sometimes competing-values offered to explain 
why pleading doctrine is the way that it is. An enduring value is notice, the 
idea that the information required under pleading doctrine is necessary to 
afford notice to one's adversaries of the charges against them, without which 
they might not be prepared to mount a defense.95 A second value is effi­
ciency, the idea that current pleading standards are meant to ensure that the 
expense to defendants and to the courts of permitting a claim to proceed is 
justified by some showing of a likelihood of merit. This value acknowledges 
that litigating meritless claims beyond the pleading stage wastes valuable 
time and money and thus it is important to screen out such claims at the ear­
liest possible stage of the litigation.96 A final value, justice, represents-in 
92. See id. (speaking of "the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitle[ment] to 
relief' "). 
93. See id. at 570 ("Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line 
from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed."). 
94. See id. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level . . . .  "). 
95. This was the rationale given by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 4 1 ,  47 ( 1957). 
Id. ("[A]ll the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant 
fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."). 
96. This rationale featured prominently in Twombly. E.g., 550 U.S. at 558 ("[W]hen the 
allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, 'this basic 
deficiency should . . .  be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the 
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part-the idea that disputes should be resolved on the merits;97 meritorious 
claims might be screened out if overly stringent pleading standards are ap­
plied before the opportunity for discovery has been given.98 Each of these 
values and the extent to which they factor into giving shape to contemporary 
pleading doctrine will be discussed below. 
A. Notice 
Notwithstanding decades of rhetoric in favor of notice as a rationale for 
pleading standards and the still-used label of "notice pleading" to describe 
our system,99 the value of notice is largely irrelevant to understanding con­
temporary standards of substantive sufficiency in pleading. 100 Certainly one 
of the important functions of a complaint is to give the defendant notice of 
the claim. Also, it is true that a complaint can be so vague that it fails to 
provide proper notice and thus can be deemed insufficient on those grounds. 
However, a complaint that adequately provides notice is not necessarily suf­
ficient to state a claim. A claim that asserts, "My employer, the defendant, 
fired me because of my gender" notifies the defendant of the nature and ba­
sis of the claim such that the defendant can respond with an admission and 
denial and move on to discovery. Further, if any additional information is 
needed, it may be obtained, in advance of a responsive pleading, via a mo­
tion for a more definite statement. 101 Thus, the statement is insufficient under 
Twombly not because of anything to do with notice but because it fails to 
suggest liability with anything beyond an unsupported speculation. The 
value of notice, then, does not help us figure out what level of factual detail 
is needed to show plausible entitlement to relief. Neither does it tell us why 
parties and the court.' ") (citation omitted); id. ("[P]roceeding to antitrust discovery can be expen­
sive . . . .  '[A] district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before 
allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.' " (quoting Associated Gen. Contrac­
tors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 ( 1983))). 
97. See, e.g., Laurence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 184-85 (2004) 
("If we take the rules of substantive law (torts, contracts, property, and so forth) as applied to the 
facts (the state of the world) as the criteria for just outcomes, then the ideal procedure would discern 
the truth about the facts and apply the law to those facts with l00% accuracy. "). 
98. Conversely, meritless claims may impose undue burdens and expense on defendants if 
pleading standards are too lax, which would represent a sort of injustice to defendants. 
99. See, e.g., Deschamps v. District of Columbia, 582 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 2008) 
("The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim so that they can pre­
pare a responsive answer and an adequate defense. " (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 
100. Professor Ides makes the same point when he writes, "[T]he question of the substantive 
adequacy of the claim asserted has nothing to do with fair notice. " Ides, supra note 77, at 6 IO; see 
also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
86 COL UM. L. REV. 433, 451 ( 1986) ("[N]otice pleading is a chimera. "). 
IOI . FED. R. Clv. P. 12(e) ("A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to 
which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot 
reasonably prepare a response. "). The Supreme Court emphasized this point in Swierkiewicz v. So­
rema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), when it wrote, "If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a 
manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under 
Rule I 2(e) before responding. " Id. at 514. 
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such a showing is necessary; notice can be achieved without it so some oth­
er value must explain the requirement. 
Why, then, all the talk of notice in the pleadings cases throughout the 
years? Such talk is likely an enduring remnant of the original motivation of 
the drafters of Rule 8; Charles Clark, the reporter to the initial rules-drafting 
committee, wrote extensively of the idea that notice to the defendant was the 
primary goal of pleadings. 102 The Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson sealed 
the deal when it made the famous pronouncement that the Rules require 
only a statement "that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plain­
tiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 103 Courts echoed that 
view over the next fifty years'04 and continue to do so to this day, prodded on 
in this regard by the Supreme Court itself. 105 So there is a fair amount of 
tradition surrounding the idea of notice as the guiding principle of our 
pleading system. 
Unfortunately, the continued exaltation of notice as the overarching val­
ue that animates our system of pleading is problematic because it obfuscates 
what the more relevant values may be and confuses courts and litigants 
about what level of factual detail a complaint should have. When courts em­
phasize the notice function of pleading as the sine qua non of a complaint as 
a prelude to the consideration of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, one of two errors can occur: a court may approve the complaint 
solely because it successfully provides notice, even though it might fail in 
Twombly terms, or a court may reject the complaint nominally on failure­
of-notice grounds when the truth is that the dismissal was for substantive 
insufficiency. Both errors confuse future litigants by muddling the stan­
dard with irrelevant notice-speak in a way that takes our eye off the real 
I 02. Clark described "the notice function of pleading " as follows: 
As probably all will concede, there is a certain minimum which can be expected of pleadings. 
They must sufficiently differentiate the situation of fact which is being litigated from all other 
situations to allow of the application of the doctrine of res judicata, whereby final adjudication 
of this particular case will end the controversy forever. As a natural corollary, they will also 
show the type of case brought, so that it may be assigned to the proper form of trial, whether 
by the jury in negligence or contract, or to a court, referee, or master, as in foreclosure, di­
vorce , accounting , and so on. 
Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456--57 (1943). He went on to emphasize his 
view that "[t]he continuous experience from common-law pleading down through the reversions to 
pleading fonnalities under code pleading indicates the necessity of keeping clearly in mind the 
limited, but important , purposes of pleading and how they cannot be pressed wisely beyond such 
purposes." Id. at 460. 
103. 355 U.S. at 4 1 ,  47 (1957). 
104. See, e.g., Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d 353, 354 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading rather than of fact pleading . . . .  "); Oil, Chem. 
& Atomic Workers Int'! Union v. Delta Ref. Co., 277 F.2d 694, 697 (6th Cir. 1960) ("Under the 
notice system of pleading established by the Rules of Civil Procedure, . . .  the ancient distinction 
between pleading 'facts' and 'conclusions' is no longer significant. "). 
105. The Court in Twombly favorably cited Conley's statement regarding the notice function 
of pleading, see 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and reiterated this view in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 
89 (2007) (per curiam). 
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issue: whether sufficient facts and supported implications were offered to 
present a plausible claim. 
Equally important, though, is that the focus on notice distracts us from 
identifying the real underlying values of pleading doctrine. This was a big 
problem prior to Twombly because before that case the Supreme Court 
strongly propounded the notice rationale in cases like Leathennan and 
Swierkiewicz while lower courts imposed heightened pleading requirements 
with other values in mind. 106 As mentioned, the Court continues to recite the 
notice value as it emphasizes other values such as efficiency. But to the ex­
tent that notice turns out to have little to do with explaining the Court's 
plausibility approach to pleading, little light is shone on more pertinent val­
ues and lower courts are led to continue peddling the idea that notice is what 
pleading is all about. 101 
B.  Efficiency 
Does efficiency-meaning consideration of prospective costs to litigants 
and the courts versus anticipated benefit-fare better as a value that explains 
post-Twombly pleading doctrine? The Court certainly made efficiency con­
cerns a prominent feature of its explanation of its retooling of pleading 
doctrine in Twombly. I08 Indeed, efficiency concerns and the need to show 
plausible entitlement to relief are intimately connected. Claims that present 
factual scenarios that fail to overcome the presumption of propriety are 
those that raise efficiency red flags. This is so because in such instances the 
court is confronted with a claimant who has offered no indication of 
106. See Fairman, supra note 7, for a discussion of lower court imposition of heightened 
pleading requirements. See also Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 24. 
107. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008), provides the most explicit 
example of the infusion of the notice rationale into the substantive sufficiency analysis: 
Fair notice under Rule 8(a)(2) depends on the type of case-some complaints will require at 
least some factual allegations to make out a "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in 
order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .  claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests." Indeed, taking Twombly and the Court's contemporaneous opinion in Erickson v. Par­
dus together, we understand the Court to instruct that a situation may arise where, at some 
point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant 
the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8. 
Id. at 232 (citations omitted). 
108. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-58 ("[S]omething beyond the mere possibility of loss causa­
tion must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless claim' be allowed to 'take up the time 
of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the 
settlement value.' " (quoting Dura Pharrns., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005))); id. at 558 
("[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to 
relief, 'this basic deficiency should . . .  be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and 
money by the parties and the court.' ") (citation omitted); id. ("[P]roceeding to antitrust discovery 
can be expensive . . . .  '[A] district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in 
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.' " (quoting Associ­
ated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 
(1983))); id. at 559 ("[l]t is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting 
conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with 
no 'reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support a 
§ I claim. ") (citation omitted). 
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entitlement to relief, which makes the value of the anticipated benefit low if 
not negligible compared with the cost in time and expense to the court and 
to other litigants. If the interests of efficient judicial administration­
preserving scarce judicial resources for the prosecution of claims that dis­
play some indicia of merit and minimizing the expenditure of private 
resources on what seems likely to be a fruitless pursuit-are a court's goal, 
then pleading standards must permit such a cost-benefit calculation to be 
made and to be made early in the process. 109 The presumption of propriety 
and the need to muster facts and supported implications to overcome that 
presumption directly serve this screening function by ensuring that claims 
gaining access to the system are only those whose anticipated benefit is de­
monstrably sufficient to warrant proceeding with the case given its expected 
costs. 
Keep in mind that by "anticipated benefit" I am not referring to the pro­
spective monetary award associated with a claimant victory. Instead, the 
term is used here to refer to the prospect of a claimant victory itself. Thus, 
the plausibility standard is not meant to aid in a raw cost-benefit analysis 
that weighs cost to the defendants and the court against the anticipated win­
nings of the plaintiff, and, indeed, the standard is not equipped to do so. 
Rather, the doctrine-at least as stated-attempts to screen only for likeli­
hood of merit. Thus, whether the threshold of plausibility is surpassed as a 
doctrinal matter should not have anything to do with the magnitude of either 
the expected cost to the litigants or the financial benefit accruing to the vic­
tor.1 10 This should be contrasted with a proportionality analysis such as one 
finds in the federal discovery rules, wherein the court is authorized to weigh 
the anticipated value of requested discovery against the burden and cost as­
sociated with production. 1 1 1  In that context, the court places a value on the 
anticipated information and judges its sufficiency in the face of a professed 
degree of burden or expense. In the pleading context, the plausibility stan­
dard is not itself a mere exercise in cost-benefit analysis as with discovery; 
the court does not value the claimant's case and compare it with costs but 
merely assesses the claim's potential merit. 
It is clear, then, that the requirement of plausibility-defined here as a 
statement of facts and supported propositions that possess a presumption of 
impropriety-derives, in part, from the interest in promoting efficient use of 
resources and sound judicial administration. Is pleading doctrine properly 
109. Id. at 558 ("[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim 
of entitlement to relief, 'this basic deficiency should . . .  be exposed at the point of minimum expen­
diture of time and money by the parties and the court.' ") (citation omitted). 
110. That said, at least some courts have gone so far as to suggest that the prospective cost of 
discovery is relevant to determining the level of factual detail needed in a complaint. See, e.g., Li­
mestone Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2008) ("If discovery is 
likely to be more than usually costly, the complaint must include as much factual detail and argu­
ment as may be required to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim."). 
111. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(2)(C) ("[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery 
otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . .  the burden or expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit . . . .  "). 
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called on to vindicate these interests? The answer to this question depends 
on what is gained and what is lost when pleadings are conscripted into such 
service. The hoped-for gains are the avoidance of economic waste and the 
freeing up of courts to adjudicate valid disputes. The potential losses, 
though, could be the frustration of valid claims and the elimination of a 
grievant's day in court. How one assesses these potential downsides to the 
pursuit of efficiency depends on how the third value we will consider, jus­
tice, is conceived. 
C. Justice 
Justice in the pleading context can refer to two things. First, it can sim­
ply be a way to refer to the value of accuracy, which in turn refers to 
judicial outcomes that properly label claims as meritorious or meritless. 
Processes that permit meritorious claims to be vindicated and meritless 
claims to be thwarted are just in the sense that they accurately resolve dis­
putes and distribute or redistribute wealth and burdens accordingly. The 
second and equally important sense of the term justice refers to the value of 
procedural fairness, meaning that the procedure established to resolve a 
dispute permits the aggrieved and the accused to participate in the proceed­
ings and have their claims and defenses heard and resolved in a fair manner. 
Processes that promote litigant access, permit the discovery of supporting 
evidence, and call for resolution by an impartial decisionmaker can be 
viewed as procedurally just regardless of the accuracy of the result. 1 12 
We ask, then, "Does contemporary pleading doctrine have justice (as de­
fined above) as a core value?" To the extent the plausibility standard 
prevents meritless claims from going forward and thus from wasting the 
time and money of courts and defendants, the standard promotes accuracy 
of outcomes. However, if the standard prevents litigants from accessing the 
system and being given a chance to support and present their claims, one 
could argue that procedural fairness will be compromised. Although accu­
rate results may be thought to trump procedural fairness, to the extent 
claimants interpret the process as one that prevented their participation, they 
are certain to develop doubts about its legitimacy. 1 13 Conversely, to the ex­
tent the plausibility standard prevents meritorious claims from proceeding, 
1 12. It is acknowledged that not all legal systems around the world provide for liberal plead­
ing standards or party-directed discovery. See, e.g., ALI/UNJDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, Principle 1 1 .3 (Proposed Final Draft 2004) ("In the pleading 
phase, the parties must present in reasonable detail the relevant facts, their contentions of law, and 
the relief requested, and describe with sufficient specification the available evidence to be offered in 
support of their allegations."). Here, I am not equating a specific pleading regime and party-directed 
discovery with procedural justice; rather, some means of litigant access to courts and some mecha­
nism for obtaining and presenting information helpful to one's case are, it seems to me, more 
fundamentally connected with the notion of procedural fairness. See, e.g. , id. at Principle 16. 1 
("Generally, the court and each party should have access to relevant and nonprivileged evidence 
. . .  ,"). 
1 1 3. Professor Lawrence Solum discusses the relationship between the value of participation 
and the legitimacy of court judgments in his article Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 8 1 , 275 
(2004). Id. ("Participation is essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication processes . . . . "). 
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both accuracy and procedural fairness are undermined. The question then is 
this: What is the risk that requiring the allegation of facts and supported im­
plications at the pleading stage will either ensnare valid claims or dispose of 
invalid claims before plaintiffs develop a sense of participation? 
The answer is likely illusive because it is unknowable whether a dis­
missed claim was nonetheless meritorious in an absolute sense. Neither can 
we know with any certainty the degree to which premature dismissals of 
invalid claims undermine the public's sense of the system's procedural fair­
ness and how that may impact its perceived legitimacy. What we can assess, 
however, is whether plausibility pleading has an inherent bias in any particu­
lar direction. We can do this by scrutinizing whether the components of the 
pleading standard-a need for facts and supported implications-are de­
signed to screen out meritless claims only or if they punish failures that 
could characterize meritless and meritorious claims alike. 
As it turns out, statements of claims can easily run afoul of the plausibil­
ity standard even though a valid claim may exist. Antitrust conspiracy 
claims provide a ready example. If an unlawful agreement to fix prices has 
in fact been made, but this fact has been concealed from the world, then 
plaintiffs complaining to have suffered harm as a result of this conspiracy 
might have valid claims, but they cannot properly show their entitlement to 
relief absent facts evidencing the agreement1 14 or facts supporting the infer­
ence of an agreement. 1 15 The same can be said of a discrimination claim. An 
employer may have indeed fired an employee for unlawful reasons but if the 
plaintiff lacks evidence of that motivation or facts supporting the inference 
of discrimination, 1 16 his mere suspicion of the same will not permit his claim 
to go forward. Indeed, in any case depending on subjective motivation or 
concealed activities the plausibility pleading standard will not necessarily 
accurately identify claims that truly lack merit. Rather, they will identify 
claims whose merit depends on information the plaintiff may not yet have. 
It seems, then, that plausibility pleading is overinclusive in that it poten­
tially keeps valid claims from entering the system. 1 17 As such, the standard 
114. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) ("[S]tating [a Sherman Act] 
claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement 
was made."). 
115. See id. at 556 n.4 (stating that " 'complex and historically unprecedented changes in 
pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple competitors, and made for no other dis­
cernible reason,' would support a plausible inference of conspiracy ") (citation omitted). 
116. An example of supporting but indirect evidence of discriminatory motives may be the 
termination of only Muslim employees immediately following the employer 's questioning of all 
employees about their religious affiliation. In such a case, the implication of discrimination is sup­
ported by the facts. 
117. As I noted in my earlier work: 
A Twombly dismissal is nothing more than a speculative assessment that the plaintiff is unlike­
ly-in the view of the court-to be able to identify facts through discovery that will support a 
claim. Permitting that assessment-rather than the stronger assessment that no set of facts 
could be proved that would entitle the pleader to relief-means that the motion to dismiss will 
weed out claims that are merely suspected of lacking merit rather than reserving dismissal only 
for those claims that are certain to lack merit. 
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cannot be said to be primarily oriented toward the promotion of just out­
comes. That does not mean that justice-at least in the sense of accuracy­
is not one of its goals; the requirement of facts plus supported inferences 
does bear some relation to prospective merit. The problem is simply that the 
standard is not sufficiently calibrated to perceive merit but rather is designed 
more for the purpose of protecting scarce economic and judicial resources 
from waste. In short, in the competition between efficiency and justice, 
plausibility pleading is designed to err on the side of efficiency: 18 Not that 
the "no set of facts" standard was precise in its labeling of claims as merito­
rious or meritless. To the contrary, that standard was underinclusive in that it 
permitted invalid claims to go forward, exalting procedural fairness (access) 
over efficiency. 1 19 Which values should take precedence is a policy question 
that depends on whether one prioritizes the need to minimize the waste of 
judicial and economic resources over the need to permit litigant access and 
ensure accurate outcomes. 120 By developing the plausibility pleading stan­
dard-buttressed with several references to efficiency concerns along the 
way-the Supreme Court in Twombly seems to have determined that effi­
ciency is the priority. 12 1  
Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 24, at 1 60. 
1 1 8. From a utilitarian perspective, this would not be a problem, so long as the overall benefit 
gained by screening out meritless claims outweighed the costs of blocking meritorious claims. Pro­
fessor Bone emphasizes this point: 
[l]t makes no sense [under a utilitarian] view to object to a strict pleading or other screening 
rule on the sole ground that it screens desirable lawsuits, including suits in which the defendant 
actually violated the law and the plaintiff could prove it with access to discovery. It depends on 
how many desirable and undesirable lawsuits are screened, the relative costs of the two types 
of error [i.e. false positives and false negatives], and the expected process costs of administer­
ing the rule. At least in theory, a strict pleading rule might be optimal even if it screened a 
large number of desirable suits. 
Bone, supra note 86, at 9 12. 
1 19. Professor Bone aptly described this shortcoming of what he labeled "the possibility 
standard": 
The problem, however, is that a possibility standard tolerates complaints that do no more than 
describe conduct within the ordinary baseline of acceptable behavior. A complaint of this sort 
gives the defendant no better reason to defend than no complaint at all. In other words, if pos­
sibility pleading is sufficient, a defendant acting perfectly appropriately could be forced to bear 
the burden of a defense without the plaintiff offering a good reason why he should do so. 
Id. at 906. 
1 20. The Federal Rules seem to contemplate a balancing of the competing values of efficiency 
and justice, rather than the prioritization of one over the other. See FED. R. C1v. P. I ("These rules 
. . . .  should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding."). 
1 2 1 .  Professor Bone seems to suggest that there is nothing inherently problematic about set­
ting the pleading standard at a level that screens out meritorious claims but there is a problem with 
developing such a standard through adjudication rather than the formal rulemaking or legislative 
process. Bone, supra note 86, at 9 1 8  ("The normative stakes involved in screening meritorious suits 
are complex and highly contested. This favors a decisionmaking process that is more open to broad­
based public input and more conducive to debate than case-by-case adjudication."). 
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IV. EVALUATING PLEADING DOCTRINE 
The fullness of the presumption-based theory of pleading is now before 
us: properly stating a claim requires the allegation of objective facts and 
supported implications that give rise to a presumption of impropriety. Fur­
ther, the core rationale for this approach is that it promotes the value of 
efficiency-the minimization of economic and judicial waste. We now tum 
to an evaluation of contemporary pleading doctrine so described, focusing 
here on the doctrine's chosen balance between efficiency and justice, and 
the impact of context on what the doctrine requires of pleadings in any given 
122 case. 
A. Balancing Efficiency and Justice 
The basic contours of this topic were discussed in the previous Section. 
Here, rather than thinking about whether and to what extent the values of 
justice and efficiency are promoted by contemporary pleading doctrine, I 
will offer a critique of the balance between the two values the doctrine has 
struck. As was noted above, efficiency concerns are preferenced under the 
current theory of pleading, as justice concerns (access and procedural fair­
ness) were privileged under the prior "no set of facts" version of the 
doctrine. But privileging efficiency at the potential expense of frustrating or 
discouraging valid claims is dubious for two reasons. 
First, although it is true that terminating a case at the pleading stage 
saves the court enormous time and keeps defendants from having to spend 
money on costly discovery, there are inefficiencies that result from the 
Twombly approach that warrant consideration. The lack of clarity and preci­
sion described in Part I above will inevitably mean that courts will apply 
pleading doctrine in varying and inconsistent ways. Incoherence from the 
courts has the potential to create an unpredictability that will underdeter 
frivolous claims and overencourage motions to dismiss. The litigation of 
motions to dismiss is not a cost-free affair for any of the parties involved, 
thus detracting to some degree from the savings gained by forgoing discov­
ery. In the event that the motion is denied and discovery ensues, litigating 
the motion has only added to the time and expense associated with the liti­
gation rather than yielding any savings. 
Second and more importantly, a standard that dismisses valid claims at 
the very front end of the system based on an inability to offer facts that 
claimants are, at this early stage, unlikely or unable to know blocks access 
to the courts in a way that is fundamentally improper. To see this, let us go 
back to the basic negligence claim represented in Form 1 1 .  That form re­
veals that pleading facts that establish the defendant's negligence-such as 
the defendant's use of a cell phone while driving, operation of the vehicle at 
excessive speed, or failure to wear required prescription spectacles-are not 
1 22. Although the focus here is on evaluating pleading doctrine along the lines noted, I offer a 
full critique of all of the problems with the doctrine emerging from Twombly in my earlier work, 
Plausibility Pleading, supra note 22. 
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necessary to state a claim. As we have already discussed, this is so in part 
because the surrounding fact of the collision itself creates a presumption of 
impropriety that gives the plaintiff a right to proceed to discovery where he 
has a good chance of substantiating his initial charge of negligent conduct. 
But Form 1 1  does not require plaintiffs to allege such facts also because 
they are facts the plaintiff may not be able to know prior to discovery. Cer­
tainly a plaintiff who is hit from behind by a car cannot state information 
pertaining to the driver's conduct inside the car that might have contributed 
to the accident. If the form did require plaintiffs to plead such information, 
there would be no way for unwitting victims who are blindsided by way­
ward vehicles to state their claims in a manner that would be sufficient in 
the eyes of the court. Under such circumstances, the pleading rule would be 
a bar to court access for claimants with legitimate grievances. Such a bar 
would seem to violate the fundamental right of access to courts 123 protected 
on the federal level by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. I24 
Although it can be said-with some confidence-that the protection of 
the Petition Clause extends to the filing of a complaint, 125 less certain is the 
scope of this protection. The Supreme Court in Bill Johnson 's Restaurants, 
Inc. v. NLRB126 indicated that the First Amendment does not protect the fil­
ing of "suits based on insubstantial claims" or "suits that lack . . . a 
'reasonable basis' " :  
123. As Professor Carol Rice Andrews astutely points out in her article A Right of  Access to 
Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 Omo ST. L.J. 557, 
563 (1999), Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), noted the 
fundamental nature of the right to claim the Jaw's protection when one receives an injury: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives injury. One of the first duties of government is to 
afford that protection . . . .  "[l]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal 
right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded. " 
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163. 
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no Jaw . . .  abridging . . .  the right of the 
people . . .  to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. "); see also Cal. Motor Transp. Co. 
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (stating that the First Amendment serves as the 
constitutional basis for the right of access to courts). The Court spoke of the importance of the right 
to sue in Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907): "The right to sue and 
defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of 
all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most 
essential privileges of citizenship . . . .  " Id. at 148. In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NI.RB, 461 
U.S. 731 (1983), the Supreme Court affirmed that "the right of access to the courts is an aspect of 
the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. " Id. at 741; see also 
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984) ("The First Amendment right protected in Bill 
Johnson 's Restaurants is plainly a 'right of access to the courts . . .  for redress of alleged wrongs. ' "  
(quoting Bill Johnson's Rests. , 461 U.S. at 741)). Another line of cases, beginning with Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), made it clear that the Due Process Clause supplied only a very 
narrow right of access for plaintiffs, primarily when the vindication of another fundamental right is 
at stake and the plaintiff has no alternative means of vindicating that right. Id. at 392-93 (invalidat­
ing a Connecticut filing fee for divorce actions, as applied to an indigent plaintiff, because it 
impermissibly infringed on the due process right to obtain a divorce). 
125. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) ("[F]iling a complaint in court is a form 
of petitioning activity . . . .  "). 
126. 461 U.S. 731 (1983). 
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Such suits are not within the scope of  First Amendment protection: "The 
first amendment interests involved in private litigation---compensation for 
violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, pub­
lic airing of disputed facts-are not advanced when the litigation is based 
on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims. Furthermore, 
since sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona fide grievance, 
it does not come within the fi rst amendment right to petition."
127 
The Court went on to hold that "baseless litigation is not immunized by 
the First Amendment right to petition."128 The key issue for our present dis­
cussion, then, is whether contemporary pleading doctrine, as described by 
the presumption-based theory outlined above, is reasonably tailored to 
screen out "baseless litigation" or impermissibly obstructs potentially valid 
claims. More specifically, though it seems clear that a hypothetical pleading 
rule that required claimants to allege unknowable facts pertaining to a de­
fendant's negligence in a car accident would be certain to prevent valid 
negligence claims from accessing the judicial system, does the same analy­
sis hold true for the post-Twombly approach to pleading, in at least some 
cases? 
If allegations attempt to attach liability to factual scenarios that are not 
presumptively improper, and overcoming that presumption and properly 
stating a claim requires the addition of facts that the plaintiff cannot know 
ex ante, the pleading standard presents an insurmountable barrier to access 
in certain cases. We have already noted above that the cases facing this chal­
lenge seem to be those for which subjective motivations or concealed 
conditions or activities are key to establishing liability-such as discrimina­
tion, antitrust, conspiracy, and products-liability claims. If a person has in 
fact been fired for an illegitimate reason, but such motivation is revealed 
only in documents that the plaintiff has not seen or is known only by wit­
nesses the plaintiff has yet to depose, that person has a valid grievance that 
the current interpretation of Rule 8 will not allow into the courts. 
Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina 129 provides an example. 130 In that case, the 
plaintiff, a former government employee, claimed in her complaint that she 
was fired from her job because of her membership in the New Progressive 
Party (NPP): "From or about November 2000, to the present time, defen­
dants have performed, fostered, and encouraged the continuous persecution, 
harassment, transfers, reprisals and demotions of Marrero and [co-plaintiff], 
because of plaintiffs' affiliation with the NPP . . . . " 13 1  In support of her claim 
that her demotion and termination were motivated by political animus to-
1 27. Id. at 743 (quoting Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust LLiws, 29 BUFF. 
L. REV. 39, 60 (1 980)). 
1 28. Id. 
1 29. 491 F.3d 1 ( 1 st Cir. 2007). 
1 30. The following discussion of Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina is taken from my previous 
writing, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 24, at 14 1-42. 
I 3 I. Amended Complaint at 'l[ 3 1 ,  Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, No. 03-1 256 (July 1 9, 2004) 
( on file with author). 
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ward her party membership, the plaintiff alleged that she held a conflicting 
party membership from the defendants; 132 that the defendants "created and 
encouraged a hostile working environment against plaintiff . . . denying her 
of equal treatment with other employees [in various enumerated ways]";133 
that her supervisor "started a pattern of insults against [the plaintiff] . . .  and 
'her group,' . . .  the New Progressive Party"; 134 and that the defendants con­
spired to humiliate her, foster insubordination toward her, reassigned her 
duties to others in the department, and ultimately terminated her all as part 
of discriminatory political "persecution." 135 Although the First Circuit panel 
acknowledged that such allegations supported "a [causal] connection [a]s 
one among a myriad of possible inferences," drawing that inference, in light 
of Twombly, would be too "speculative": "Merely juxtaposing that she is an 
active member of the NPP and that the defendants are affiliated with the 
[rivaling Popular Democratic Party] is insufficient, standing alone, to create 
a causal link." 136 
Assuming the plaintiff here alleged all of the relevant facts that she had 
at her disposal, there was not more she could offer in support of her claim 
absent discovery. And the factual scenario presented certainly would seem 
to at least raise a suspicion of improper conduct, even if there could be per­
fectly legitimate explanations for what transpired. Under such 
circumstances, it seems inappropriate to terminate the plaintiff's claim, giv­
en that it is not clearly or even probably "baseless," meritless, or lacking a 
"reasonable basis." Similar examples exist in civil rights 137 and other con­
texts 138 as well. 
It seems, then, that requiring particularized pleading in these types of 
cases effectively prevents some claimants from seeking redress for what 
1 32. Id. 'l\'l[ 28-29. 
1 33. Id. 'l[ 4 1 .  
1 34. Id. 'l[ 42. 
1 35. Id. 'l\'l[ 43-59. 
1 36. Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 49 1 F.3d I, 10 ( 1 st Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 
1 37. In Pleading Civil Rights Claims I offered several examples of cases where the courts 
dismissed claims even though the factual allegations created a legitimate suspicion of wrongdoing. 
See Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims, supra note 24, at 14 1-42. 
138. In Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 5 1 8  F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008), the following allega-
tions were deemed insufficient to state an antitrust conspiracy claim: 
( I )  [E]ach Bank defendant "participates in the management of and has a proprietary interest 
in" the Consortiums [MasterCard and Visa]; (2) the Banks charge appellants "the amount of 
the interchange rate fixed by the Consortiums as the merchant discount fee"; (2) [sic] the 
Banks adopt the interchange fees set by the Consortiums; (3) the acquiring banks "knowingly, 
intentionally and actively participated in an individual capacity with the Consortiums in charg­
ing the fixed minimum merchant discount fees"; and (4) there is an agreement among all 
financial institutions to charge a minimum merchant discount fee set by the Consortiums. 
Id. at 1048. The court dismissed the allegation of knowing, intentional, and active participation by 
the Banks in the fee-fixing scheme as "nothing more than a conclusory statement" and found that 
"the complaint does not answer the basic questions: who, did what, to whom (or with whom), 
where, and when?" Id. 
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could be legitimate grievances. 139 If the constitutional line is drawn at per­
mitting procedural rules to bar "baseless" claims that lack a "reasonable 
basis" 140-a line that admittedly has not been definitively drawn by the 
Court-then the line drawn by contemporary pleading doctrine is inapt in 
certain cases. Reforming the doctrine to relieve plaintiffs of the obligation to 
allege the specifics underlying subjective motivations or concealed condi­
tions or activities might be one way to remedy the imbalance. 141  However, 
crafting a rule or standard that did not err too much in the opposite direc­
tion-the acceptance of thin claims that result in the imposition of 
exorbitant discovery costs on defendants-would be a serious challenge. 
Thus, a better approach might be to permit judges to identify those cases 
where additional facts are needed to support the needed inference and re­
serve judgment on the motion to dismiss until after limited, focused 
discovery on that issue can occur. 142 If enough facts to support the inference 
cannot be uncovered after this mini-discovery process, then the claim may 
be dismissed with more confidence that a meritless claim was turned away. 
Expanding claimant access to presuit discovery would serve a similar func-
1 39. Although here I focus on the fundamental impropriety of a pleading standard that blocks 
access to courts in circumstances where a plaintiff cannot know the information she is being asked 
to allege, such a standard can also be criticized more directly in economic terms: 
If the operative pleading standard required plaintiff to allege facts that she cannot reasonably 
be expected to know at the case's inception, this informational asymmetry would in tum pre­
vent proper functioning of the litigation market. The plaintiffs failure to plead unknowable 
facts could in some cases result in dismissal of a claim that should have been successful, and 
net social welfare decreases as the defendant unjustly retains wealth that should have compen­
sated plaintiff for her injury. 
Paul J. Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation 28 (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Papers Series, 
Research Paper No. LE08-01 8, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/pape.tar?abstract_ 
id= l 266323. 
140. Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983). 
1 4 1 .  Rule 9(b) does provide that " [m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions o f  a per­
son's mind may be alleged generally, " FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), but this has not prevented courts from 
demanding facts that substantiate allegations of discriminatory motive. In any event, a rule along the 
same lines that incorporated other matters that may be alleged generally-such as discriminatory 
motive or the existence of a secret agreement-might help bring pleading doctrine closer to permit­
ting potentially valid claims to proceed. 
142. One could argue that judges already have the authority to tailor discovery in this way via 
their authority under Rule 26. Justice Stevens reasoned thusly in his Twombly dissent: 
Rule 26 confers broad discretion to control the combination of interrogatories, requests for 
admissions, production requests, and depositions permitted in a given case; the sequence in 
which such discovery devices may be deployed; and the limitations imposed upon them. In­
deed, Rule 26(c) specifically permits a court to take actions "to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" by, for example, disal­
lowing a particular discovery request, setting appropriate terms and conditions, or limiting its 
scope. 
550 U.S. 544, 594 n. 13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 
598-99 (I 998)). Rule I 6 gives judges relevant authority over discovery as well. See FED. R. Civ. P. 
16(c)(2)(F) (giving courts the authority to take appropriate action with respect to "controlling and 
scheduling discovery, including orders affecting disclosures and discovery under Rule 26 and Rules 
29 through 27"). 
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tion. 143 Another possibility would be  to hold counsel to their obligation un­
der Rule 1 1  to certify that the factual contentions "will likely have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation 
or discovery." 144 That means making plaintiffs' counsel accountable for sanc­
tions in the event that discovery reveals that the claim was baseless in a way 
that counsel should have, ex ante, been able to detect. A court's authority to 
manage a case under Rule 16  could be invoked to aid in these efforts as 
well, although the Twombly Court seemed skeptical of a judge's ability to 
use such authority profitably in this regard. 145 
Finally, reforming the American Rule 146 in a way that puts more pressure 
on plaintiffs to bring forward only those claims they can support might stem 
the tide of meritless claims that a more permissive pleading rule might en­
courage, although any cost-shifting reform would have to be careful not to 
chill the claims of legitimate grievants. 147 Alternatively, plaintiffs could be 
charged with shouldering the cost of any limited, preliminary discovery the 
court decides to allow to determine the potential merit of their claims. As­
sessing the merits of these and other potential means of revising pretrial 
procedures to better distinguish valid from meritless claims is beyond the 
scope of this Article and will thus have to be the work of future scholarly 
inquiry. Suffice it to say here that there are ways that pleading doctrine 
could be reformed and that other procedural devices could be employed to 
better serve the interests of justice-both in the sense of accuracy and in the 
sense of procedural fairness-and better protect the right to access en­
shrined in the Petition Clause. 
143. The Federal Rules provide for prefiling discovery but have been generally interpreted to 
preserve only testimony that is at risk of being unavailable once an action is commenced. See Penn 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1371, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Unlike other discovery 
rules, Rule 27(a) allows a party to take depositions prior to litigation if it demonstrates an expecta­
tion of future litigation, explains the substance of the testimony it expects to elicit and the reasons 
the testimony is important, and establishes a risk that testimony will be lost if not preserved. "). 
Professor Lonny Hoffman discusses presuit discovery on the federal and state level in Using Presuit 
Discovery to Overcome Barriers to the Courthouse, 34 LITIG. 31 (2008). See also Bone, supra note 
86, at 934-35 (discussing postfiling, predismissal discovery, something he refers to as "pleading 
stage discovery"). 
144. FED. R. Civ. P. l l(b)(3). 
145. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, was more confident and pointed to authority under Rule 
16 and other rules to manage cases in a way that would minimize the potential abuses identified by 
the Twombly majority. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593-94 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court 
vastly underestimates a district court's case-management arsenal. Before discovery even begins, the 
court may grant a defendant's Rule 12(e) motion; Rule 7(a) permits a trial court to order a plaintiff 
to reply to a defendant 's answer, and Rule 23 requires 'rigorous analysis ' to ensure that class certifi­
cation is appropriate. Rule 16 invests a trial judge with the power, backed by sanctions, to regulate 
pretrial proceedings via conferences and scheduling orders . . . .  ") (citations omitted). 
146. The "American Rule" provides that parties bear their own litigation expenses. Alyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc 'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (indicating that the American Rule 
applies not only to attorney 's fees but also to other costs of litigation, including expert-witness fees 
and miscellaneous costs such as transcripts and duplication). 
147. For a discussion of the impact of moving to the English Rule or a "loser pays" system, 
see Marie Gryphon, Greater Justice, Lower Cost: How a "Loser Pays" Rule Would Improve the 
American Legal System, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE CENTER FOR LEGAL POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE RE­
PORT, Dec. 2008. 
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Many of the courts that have considered Twombly's standard have ex­
pressed the view that the case propounds a context-dependent approach to 
pleading, 148 but have not always articulated specifically how context affects 
the level of facts that must be alleged. 149 As the Seventh Circuit remarked, 
"[H]ow many facts are enough will depend on the type of case. In a com­
plex antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found in 
the sample complaints in the civil rules' Appendix of Forms may be neces­
sary to show that the plaintiff's claim is not ' largely groundless.' "150 
Indeed, pleading doctrine as described by the theory set forth above is 
context dependent, meaning the level of factual detail needed to get to a pre­
sumption of impropriety will vary depending on the factual and legal 
context of the claim. For example, a claim asserting trespass on one's prop­
erty will possess a presumption of impropriety by simply stating the fact of 
the plaintiff's ownership of the property and the defendant's unconsented-to, 
harmful intrusion on the same. 15 1  These facts, if true, outline a scenario that 
suggests the liability of the defendant for the trespass alleged. The defendant 
may have competing facts that would dispute whether an intrusion had oc­
curred or that it was done without permission, but those are considerations 
not relevant at the pleading stage in light of the assumption-of-truth rule. 
148. See, e.g., Breaux v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 554 F.3d 854, 862 ( 1 0th Cir. 2009) ("The 
degree of specificity needed to establish plausibility and fair notice, and the need for sufficient fac­
tual allegations depend upon the context of the case. "); Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 
217, 225 (2d Cir. 2008) ("We recognize that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly requires a heightened 
pleading standard 'in those contexts where [factual] amplification is needed to render [a] claim 
plausible,' including, most notably, the antitrust context. " (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 
(2d Cir. 2007))); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) ("The Third Circuit 
has noted, and we agree, that the degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair 
notice, and therefore the need to include sufficient factual allegations, depends on context. . . .  "); 
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Twombly decision focuses 
our attention on the 'context' of the required short, plain statement. Context matters in notice plead­
ing. Fair notice under Rule 8(a)(2) depends on the type of case . . . .  "); Kelley v. N.Y. Life Ins. & 
Annuity Corp., No. 07-cv-01702-LTB-BNB, 2008 WL 1782647, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 17, 2008) 
("[T]he determination of whether a complaint contains enough allegations of fact to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face is dependent on the context of the claim raised. "); see also 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 580 n.6 (Stevens, J ., dissenting) ("The majority is correct to say that what the 
Federal Rules require is a 'showing' of entitlement to relief. Whether and to what extent that 'show­
ing' requires allegations of fact will depend on the particulars of the claim. ") (citation omitted). 
149. The Tenth Circuit provided some specifics regarding how context affects the needed facts 
in VanZandt v. Oklahoma Dep 't of Human Services, 276 F. App'x 843, 847 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he 
degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice is dependent on the context of 
the case involved . . . .  [l]n the context of a case involving qualified immunity, plaintiffs must allege 
facts sufficient to show that the defendants violated their constitutional rights, and that those rights 
were clearly established at the time. "). 
150. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
151. See, e.g., Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337 (D. 
Conn. 2007) ("In Connecticut, the elements of a trespass action are: '(I) ownership or possessory 
interest in land by the plaintiff; (2) invasion, intrusion, or entry by the defendant affecting the plain­
tiffs exclusive property interest; (3) done intentionally; and (4) causing direct injury. "') (citation 
omitted). 
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This contrasts with an antitrust conspiracy claim, where the mere descrip­
tion of objective facts such as noncompetition, similar pricing, or parallel 
behavior by competitors would not suffice to create a presumption of im­
propriety. An antitrust conspiracy claim depends on the existence of an 
agreement to which the plaintiff was not a party. Thus, the mere assertion of 
an agreement will be a supposition that is not necessarily implied from the 
objective facts alleged. Additional facts-such as the existence of meetings 
or documents supporting the idea that an agreement was reached-are 
needed to make the supposition a supported implication. 152 
What characteristics distinguish those claims requiring the pleading of 
few facts from those requiring additional factual detail? The key dividing 
line seems to be between claims that require suppositions to connote 
wrongdoing and those based on facts that indicate impropriety on their 
own. For example, contract claims appear to be the kind of claim for 
which suppositions are not necessary to state a valid claim. To prove a 
breach-of-contract claim, as we have already discussed, one need establish 
the existence of a contract, the breach of a duty by the defendant, and re­
sulting harm. 153 The plaintiff need not suppose any of these to be the case; 
she has first-hand knowledge of these facts-if they indeed exist-and 
may simply relate them to the court to state a claim. A copyright, patent, 
or trademark-infringement claim is not much different. To prove such 
claims, one has to establish ownership of a valid copyright, patent, or 
trademark and unauthorized use or copying thereof by the defendant. 154 
Again, the plaintiff can outline a set of objective facts pertaining to owner­
ship and unauthorized use that will fairly readily make the presumption of 
liability on the part of the defendant plausible, assuming the truth of the 
plaintiff's assertions . 
Conversely, products liability, civil conspiracy, antitrust, and civil rights 
claims, for example, are more challenging to allege because each claim re­
quires the proffering of a supposition of some sort to tum what happened 
1 52. For example, in the antitrust conspiracy context the Ninth Circuit requires the pleading 
of "evidentiary facts sufficient to establish a conspiracy, " "such as a 'specific time, place, or person 
involved in the alleged conspiracies . . .  .' " Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 5 18 F.3d 1042, 1 045, 1 047 
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n. IO (2007)). Other courts 
within the Ninth Circuit have similarly required pleading of the who, what, when, where, and how 
of an alleged anticompetitive agreement. See, e.g., In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litig., 528 F. 
Supp. 2d 953, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("The complaint does include several conclusory allegations 
that the defendants agreed to increase late fees, but it provides no details as to when, where, or by 
whom this alleged agreement was reached. "); Int'I Norcent Tech. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 
No. CV 07-00043 MMM (SSx), 2007 WL 4976364, at * 10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29 , 2007) ("Norcent has 
not alleged any facts supporting its claim that the Group of IO agreed not to sell video disc players 
that did not comply with the DVD standard. It has not alleged when the purported agreement was 
made. Nor has it stated who made the decision, how it was made or what the parameters of the 
agreement were. "). 
1 53. Many jurisdictions also impose the requirement that the plaintiff establish its perform­
ance under the contract. 
1 54. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (199 1 )  ("To estab­
lish infringement, two elements must be proven: ( I )  ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying 
of constituent elements of the work that are original."). 
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into an actionable event. In the products liability area the supposition is that 
the product at issue was defective. Only additional objective facts tending to 
show an unreasonable level of dangerousness155 will validate the supposi­
tion, converting it into a supported implication. 156 Civil conspiracy claims 
depend on a supposition that the defendant entered into an agreement. 
Again, objective facts that support the notion of an agreement must be sup­
plied. 157 I t  thus appears that if a claim places liability on occurrences or 
omissions for which objective facts make the implication of wrongdoing 
apparent, that claim will require less factual detail than a claim that depends 
on subjective motivations or concealed activities. 
Here, then, we arrive at a response to one of the questions we posed ini­
tially: under what principle is the negligence complaint in Form 11 
sufficient but an equally spare statement of a discrimination claim insuffi­
cient? The facts surrounding the assertion of negligence-the collision of 
the defendant's motor vehicle with the plaintiff-bespeaks wrongdoing 
155. A "defect " is ordinarily defined as anything that makes the product "unreasonably dan­
gerous." Determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is done with reference to an 
array of factors such as the likelihood that the product will cause injury, the probable seriousness of 
the injury, and the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without 
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive. See, e.g. , Effkay Enters. v. J.H. Cleaners, Inc., 
No. 07-cv-02521-LTB, 2008 WL 2357698, at *6 (D. Colo. June 5, 2008). 
1 56. For example, in Efjkay Enterprises, 2008 WL 2357698, the court listed the following 
allegations: 
[T]he cleaning chemicals were defective products because, among other things, they caused 
groundwater contamination even when used in their foreseeable and intended manner, they 
rendered water unfit for drinking even at extremely low levels, they were toxic to the liver, 
kidneys, and nervous system, they posed a significant threat to public health, and Katzson 
failed to provide adequate warnings of the known and foreseeable risks associated with the 
cleaning chemicals . . . .  
Id. Similarly, in Larsen-Anstine v. Shell Oil Co., No. 3:07-CV-290-M, 2007 WL 2079845 (N.D. Tex. 
July I 9, 2007) the court listed allegations that established dangerousness: 
Decedent was exposed to toxins and carcinogens, specifically benzene, as an ingredient, com­
ponent or contaminant in JP-4 and other aviation gas (hereinafter "Jet Fuel ") manufactured, 
marketed, sold and/or supplied by Defendants. Decedent's exposures to benzene-containing Jet 
Fuel were a legal cause of his leukemia and subsequent death on February 15, 2005. Defen­
dants are liable in their capacity for manufacturing, selling, marketing, distributing, and/or 
designing Jet Fuel that was defective, hazardous and/or carcinogenic. 
Id. at * ! .  
I 57. A survey o f  civil conspiracy cases reveals a requirement that a complaint contain factual 
allegations pertaining to the who, what, when, where, and why of a conspiracy to state a sufficient 
civil conspiracy claim. See, e.g., Sung Tran v. Delavau, LLC, No. 07-3550, 2008 WL 2051992 (E.D. 
Pa. May 13, 2008). As one court reasoned: 
[The plaintiff) fails to identify the objectives, time and place of the conspiracy. He makes no 
allegations as to the roles of the defendants, and, with respect to defendants Delavau and Local 
169, makes no allegations as to their culpable conduct, or even that they made any agreement 
with the other alleged co-conspirators. 
Id. at * 1 1 ; see also TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. GSM Group, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 133 I ,  1336 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008) (''The Complaint contains detailed factual allegations of the Bulk Resale Scheme includ­
ing the method, operation and duration of the scheme. The complaint further details defendant's 
alleged misconduct and the location from which defendant operated the scheme . . . .  Accordingly, 
the Court finds that the Complaint is sufficient to meet the pleading threshold of Fed.R.Civ.P. 
8(a). "). 
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without need for any suppositions because, as we have said, such a scenario 
presumptively arises out of some type of wrongdoing. However, the facts 
surrounding the unadorned assertion of a discriminatory firing-the fact of 
the firing itself-does not have the same effect. The latter scenario is not 
presumptively wrongful but requires a supposition regarding the defendant's 
motivation. 158 
Although the dividing line is largely between claims that rest on objec­
tive and knowable facts and those that require suppositions about subjective 
motivations, states of mind, or concealed activities, our brief survey above 
raises the question of whether drawing the line in such fashion privileges 
private disputes such as the contract and negligence claims over more pub­
lic-rights oriented matters like antitrust and discrimination claims. More 
study needs to be done across all types of claims to determine whether this 
suggestion matches reality. However, to the extent that pleading doctrine 
does have a bias in favor of private disputes or a bias against statutory 
claims or claims that bear somehow on the public interest-such as prod­
ucts-liability claims-that would be disturbing. Many of the claims falling 
within the latter category are important from a public-policy perspective 
because they exist to enable private citizens to enforce societal policy and 
regulatory interests such as free market competition, nondiscrimination, 
product safety, and environmental protection. Designing pleading doctrine 
in a way that frustrates such claims undermines the furtherance of the under­
lying policy goals and does so-as discussed above-in a way that is not 
sufficiently calibrated to assess potential merit. Perhaps substance-specific 
pleading reforms tied to various types of claims connected more with the 
public interest rather than mere private dispute resolution could be explored 
to permit such claims to progress at least to a point where judgments about 
their merit can be made with more confidence. 
Finally, language from Twombly could support the idea that pleading 
standards also vary depending on a different kind of context than what we 
have been discussing thus far: the complexity and prospective cost associ­
ated with litigating the claim. The Twombly Court certainly made the cost of 
discovery relevant to its analysis, and lower courts that are so inclined may 
feel encouraged to do the same. 159 But I would argue that permitting context 
in this sense to influence the level of factual detail would not only be prob­
lematic in that it would render the doctrine even more subjective and 
158. Although distinguishing between a collision caused by negligence, recklessness, or in­
tentional conduct requires some supposition of intent, the supposition is needed only to identify the 
degree of wrongdoing or culpability, not to establish whether wrongdoing of any kind occurred. 
Indeed, which among the several degrees of liability properly characterizes the defendant's culpabil­
ity is not a matter readily accessible to the plaintiff at the pleading stage. Thus, Rule 8 countenances 
the pleading of each of these conflicting possibilities simultaneously as possible alternative theories. 
See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) ("A party may set out two or more statements of a claim or defense alter­
natively . . . .  "); FED. R. C1v. P. 8(d)(3) ("A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it 
has, regardless of consistency. "). 
159. E.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2008) 
("If discovery is likely to be more than usually costly, the complaint must include as much factual 
detail and argument as may be required to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim. "). 
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unpredictable, 160 but it would also be doctrinally unsound for such consid­
erations to infect the analysis. Although plausibility may properly vary 
depending on substantive legal and factual context, whether discovery is 
expected to cost $ 1  million or $ 10  million does not, strictly speaking, bear 
on whether the plausibility threshold has been surpassed. If courts wish to 
weigh such cost considerations in the balance at the pleading stage, it would 
be more appropriate for the rules to make the propriety-and the means-of 
doing so more explicit. 
CONCLUSION 
Pleading doctrine has been irreversibly modernized in the direction of 
attending more to the concerns of efficient judicial administration, a modifi­
cation that was perhaps overdue. Indeed, the Federal Rules were crafted 
well before the rise of modem litigation, with its class actions and public­
rights disputes, and prior to the advent of electronically stored information 
and the exorbitant discovery expenses that go with it. By embracing the 
standard of plausibility, the Court has refocused the threshold inquiry on the 
presence of facts that suggest l iability ; equivocal facts can no longer permit 
the invocation of discovery given its current costs. But getting past neutral 
facts to those suggestive of liability will be more difficult in those cases 
where suppositions about the defendants' subjective motivations or con­
cealed activities are needed to overcome the presumption of propriety. When 
such information is unknown or unknowable from the plaintiff's perspective 
at the pleading stage, the doctrine is too unforgiving and unaccommodating, 
leaving plaintiffs with potentially valid claims with no access to the system. 
Recalibrating the doctrine to permit more generalized allegations of certain 
components of a claim, coupled perhaps with discovery reform that permits 
greater access to prefiling or staged discovery could go a long way toward 
restoring a proper balance between efficiency and access. In the meantime, I 
would urge courts to be conscious of the challenge that certain claims­
particularly those of larger public-policy significance-face under contem­
porary pleading doctrine, and to find creative ways to use their managerial 
authority to give potentially valid claims their due before closing the court­
house door. 
1 60. See Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks ofTwombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 
ST. JottN's L. REV. 893, 909 (2008) ("If 'flexible plausibility' does not apply equally to all cases but 
depends on complexity, issue, and context, we are adding layers of complexity to what the Federal 
Rules drafters had contemplated would be a fairly simple and straightforward test."). 
